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 Judging as Judgment:  Tying Judicial 
Education to Adjudication Theory 
ROBERT G. BONE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis of this Article, simply stated, is that judicial education makes sense 
only against the backdrop of general ideas and beliefs about law, courts, and adju-
dication.  These ideas and beliefs motivate a focus on educating judges and help 
guide more specific pedagogical choices.  I explore this broad thesis from both a 
historical and a normative perspective.
1
  Historically, I argue that interest in judi-
cial education caught fire in the 1960s in large part because of prevailing beliefs 
about law and the proper function of courts.  Normatively, I argue that the connec-
tion between judicial education and normative views of courts and adjudication 
continues to be important today, although in a different way.  Judicial education 
has a vital role to play in engaging and testing different views of civil adjudication 
and its proper function.  In particular, in-person, face-to-face instruction is valua-
ble as a way for judges to reflect critically on principles that underlie American 
adjudication and to work out a shared conception of the institution that fits the 
core elements of litigation practice. 
Prior to the 1950s, judges received little in the way of formal training.  They 
might have attended the occasional judicial conference or perhaps a seminar on a 
specific topic of interest, but mainly they were expected to learn on their own.
2
  It 
was not until the 1960s that enthusiasm for formal education caught hold.
3
  Today, 
there are many different programs for state and federal judges, both at the trial and 
the appellate level.  While many of these offerings focus on specific areas of sub-
stantive and procedural law, some cover more general aspects of the judicial pro-
cess, such as case management, judicial decision-making, and opinion writing.
4
 
The original choice to make formal education regularly available to judges is 
highly significant.  Those who pushed for it in the late 1950s and 1960s were 
strongly influenced by prevailing beliefs about courts, adjudication, and effective 
judging.  Today, the selection of topics for instruction also reflects beliefs about 
judging and adjudication.  For example, courses in pre-trial management and set-
tlement rest on an assumption, itself contested, that judges should be involved in 
                                                          
*  G. Rollie White Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.  I wish to thank the partic-
ipants in the Judicial Education Symposium at the University of Missouri School of Law for helpful 
comments.  I am also grateful to Ashley Croswell and Sara Martin for their valuable research assis-
tance. 
1.  I approach this topic with some trepidation.  My work in civil procedure includes forays into ad-
judication theory, but judicial education itself is a new area for me.  Also, as a law professor, I do not 
face the same practical constraints and pressures judges and practicing lawyers do.  My hope is that a 
relatively detached perspective has something valuable to offer. 
 2. See Delmar Karlen, Judicial Education, 52 A.B.A. J. 1049, 1049 (1966). 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
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managing cases and facilitating settlements, and this assumption in turn presumes 
certain beliefs about the nature and function of civil adjudication.
5
 
Indeed, I shall argue that judicial education makes its most valuable contribu-
tion when it provides an opportunity for judges to reflect critically on their own 
beliefs.  Hence the title of this article: Judging involves judgment, and judgment 
must be guided and constrained by the institutional context in which it is exer-
cised.  This means that to exercise judgment responsibly, a judge must first work 
out a general conception of the institution of civil adjudication in which she acts.  
Judicial education has an important role to play in this process.  An in-person, 
face-to-face instructional format is, I believe, a particularly effective way for 
judges to engage one another in formulating and debating general principles that 
fit and justify core features of litigation practice and civil adjudication.  The over-
all aim should be to work out, to the extent feasible, a shared understanding of the 
institution that can guide the adjudication of cases and the design of procedural 
rules. 
The body of this Article is divided into three parts.  Part I describes the rise of 
judicial education in the 1960s and explains why it caught on then and not earlier.  
Part II briefly surveys the general types of judicial education programs and cours-
es being offered today.  Part III builds on the discussion in Parts I and II to argue 
that in-person, face-to-face judicial education has an important role to play in 
bringing judges together to engage in a group process of critical reflection. 
I.  A HISTORY OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION IN THE U.S. 
Although there were a few scattered courses for judges before the mid-1950s, 
no systematic programs existed.  Traffic and juvenile court judges received some 
limited instruction, and the United States Judicial Conference Committee on Pre-
Trial Procedure offered federal district judges training in the use of pre-trial pro-
cedure.
6
  But for the most part, formal courses for judges simply did not exist.  In 
fact, few jurists took the idea of judicial education at all seriously.  As a notable 
figure in the later judicial education movement remarked in 1966, “[a]s recently as 
fifteen years ago, the thought of judges going back to school would have seemed 
ludicrous to most members of the legal profession.”7 
This situation changed markedly—and rapidly—in the late 1950s and 1960s.  
The following discussion first describes what happened and then offers an expla-
nation for why it happened when it did. 
                                                          
 5. So too, programs that feature economic analysis assume judges should apply economics when 
deciding cases.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 105-30 (2013) [hereinafter 
R. POSNER, REFLECTIONS] (recommending courses for judges in economics and statistics). 
 6. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 944-45 & n. 63 (2000). 
 7. Karlen, supra note 2, at 1049; see also Francis C. Cady & Glenn E. Coe, Education of Judicial 
Personnel: Coals to Newcastle, 7 CONN. L. REV. 423, 424 (1975) (“Prior to 1956, it would have been 
considered an affront to the judiciary to suggest that judges should continue their education after their 
elevation to the bench.  It had simply been assumed that, by donning a judicial robe, a mere mortal was 
immediately transformed into the image of Jove on Olympus.”); Resnik, supra note 6, at 944 (quoting 
an ABA Report to say that before the 1950s “the use of the word ‘education’ in connection with the 
judiciary brought raised eyebrows”) (quoting ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ABA, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE FOR THE EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 625 (1963)). 
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A.  The Emergence of Judicial Education 
In 1956, the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York University 
School of Law held a summer seminar for appellate judges, the first in a series 
that continues to this day.
8
  The success of this pioneering effort helped convince 
the profession that classes for judges could work well if designed properly.  In 
1963, reflecting back on seven years of the NYU program, Warren Burger, then a 
federal judge sitting on the D.C. Court of Appeals, noted the importance of the 
program and its influence on other judicial education efforts.
9
 
However, it was not until 1961 that the judicial education movement caught 
fire.  In that year, the American Bar Association, the American Judicature Society, 
and eight other organizations committed to court reform joined in a coalition, 
Project Effective Justice, which, in turn, created the Joint Committee for the Ef-
fective Administration of Justice (“Joint Committee”) with United States Supreme 
Court Justice Tom C. Clark as its chair.
10
  Many lawyers and judges at the time 
celebrated the formation of Project Effective Justice and its Joint Committee as a 
major step in the campaign for court reform.  Indeed, in announcing the Joint 
Committee, the Journal of the American Judicature Society predicted it would 
“develop into the greatest concerted drive for the improvement of justice in the 
history of the nation.”11 
What is striking for our purposes is that the Joint Committee, from its incep-
tion, focused on judicial education as a way to effect court reform.
12
  Between 
1961 and 1963, the Committee organized some fifty seminars for state trial judges 
throughout the country.
13
  These seminars were so popular that they “reached 
virtually every judge sitting in a state court of general jurisdiction.”14 
The success of these initial efforts laid the groundwork for an expanded pro-
gram.  When the Joint Committee’s funding ran out in 1964, Clark, along with 
others in Project Effective Justice, located a new funding source and established 
the National College of State Trial Judges (“National College”) to take over the 
Joint Committee’s educational work.  The National College held its first summer 
                                                          
 8. Karlen, supra note 2, at 1050 (reporting that the first seminar attracted twenty judges from state 
supreme courts and federal appellate courts).  Dean Arthur Vanderbilt founded the Institute for Judicial 
Administration at NYU in 1952 with the aim of coordinating work and publishing studies on judicial 
administration.  Dean Vanderbilt went on to become Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court.  
See Resnik, supra note 6, at 944 n.65.  The NYU seminar is still offered today.  See, e.g., New Appel-
late Judges Seminar, NYU LAW, http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/judicial/2014AJS (last visited May 
30, 2015). 
 9. Warren E. Burger, School for Judges, 33 F.R.D. 139 (1963). 
 10. Society Joins in New Nation-Wide Campaign for Effective Administration of Justice, 45 J. AM. 
JUD. SOC. 46 (1961) [hereinafter Nation-Wide Campaign]. 
 11. Id. at 46 (noting that the “project was conceived as a device for mobilizing all of the resources of 
the country in the field of judicial reform”). 
 12. See Karlen, supra note 2, at 1051; Maurice Rosenberg, Judging Goes to College, 52 A.B.A. J. 
342, 342 (1966). 
 13. See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 343 (describing the Joint Committee’s efforts); Tom C. Clark, 
Message from the Chairman: An Idea Becomes a National Program, 46 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 8, 8-9 (1962) 
(reporting that the Joint Committee has furnished eight seminars involving “some 750 judges in 17 
states, one territory and one exclusively metropolitan area” and plans more programs which “before 
Christmas 1962 . . . will have reached an additional 16 states and one metropolitan area.”). 
 14. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUDICIAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
SURVEY 90 (1965) [hereinafter JUDICIAL EDUCATION SURVEY]. 
3
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session in July 1964, at the University of Colorado School of Law.
15
  This initial 
session was an intense four-week course of instruction with classes conducted “on 
the problem-discussion method” and covering topics related to trial procedure and 
court administration.
16
  The National College offered similar courses in subse-
quent years and under a slightly different name (“The National Judicial College”) 
continues to do so today.
17
 
The National College provided courses for state trial judges, and the NYU 
seminars catered to state and federal appellate judges.  But there was little in the 
way of systematic instruction for federal district judges at the time.  The United 
States Judicial Conference and its committees organized a few seminars on assort-
ed topics, such as pre-trial procedure in protracted cases, federal probation and 
sentencing, and bankruptcy.
18
  In most respects, however, the educational offer-
ings were very limited.
19
 
This situation changed dramatically with the creation of the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) in 1967.  The FJC was established as an independent agency com-
mitted to research, education, and the administration of justice in the federal judi-
ciary.
20
  During its first several years of operation, the FJC concentrated on 
providing seminars for newly appointed district judges and other district court 
personnel.
21
  In 1973, it added seminars for experienced district court judges and 
                                                          
 15. Karlen, supra note 2, at 1051; Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 342.  The National College of State 
Trial Judges began at the University of Colorado and then transferred to the University of Nevada in 
Reno after receiving long term funding from the Fleischman Foundation of Nevada.  Rosenberg, supra 
note 12, at 342-43.  It later became the National Judicial College, which is still connected with the 
University of Nevada in Reno and continues to stage a variety of courses and educational programs for 
state judges.  See THE NAT’L JUDICIAL COLL., www.judges.org (last accessed May 30, 2015). 
 16. Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 343-44; The National College of State Trial Judges, 48 J. AM. JUD. 
SOC. 95 (1964) [hereinafter National College] (reporting on the first session held in July 1964 and 
noting “[t]he courses were presented through a series of problems with discussion of specific solu-
tions”).  Professor Maurice Rosenberg, a Columbia Law School professor who taught in the summer 
sessions, reported in 1966 that the July sessions for the first two years (1964 and 1965) were attended 
by about 100 judges selected from about 300 applicants and that the typical student “had been named 
to his court less than two years earlier” for the 1964 session and less than a year earlier for the 1965 
session.  Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 343-44; see also National College, supra, at 96.  The topics 
included evidence, civil pre-trial conference, criminal procedure, domestic relations jurisdiction, sen-
tencing and probation, judicial process and judicial ethics, judge-jury relations, jury instructions, judi-
cial discretion, court organization and management, and relations among the courts, the bar, and the 
public.  National College, supra, at 95-96. 
 17. A Report on the National College, 6 TRIAL JUDGES’ J. 1, 1 (1967) (“By the end of the summer 
sessions in 1969, more than 1400 judges or over one-third of the total number [of general jurisdiction 
trial judges] will have attended one of the four-week sessions of the College.”). 
 18. See JUDICIAL EDUCATION SURVEY, supra note 14, at 64-70 (describing educational efforts at 
annual circuit meetings); Karlen, supra note 2, at 1050 (the Judicial Conference organized programs 
for federal trial judges focused on trials of protracted cases); Russell R. Wheeler, Empirical Research 
and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 36 (Summer 1988) (as of 1966, the Judicial Conference and its committees were 
“sponsoring fourteen programs of continuing education”). 
 19. See William M. Schwarzer, The Federal Judicial Center and the Administration of Justice in the 
Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1132 (1995). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (2014); Schwarzer, supra note 19, at 1132-34.  The original enabling 
statute provided that the FJC would function “to stimulate, create, develop, and conduct programs of 
continuing education and training for personnel of the judicial branch of the Government, including, 
but not limited to, judges, referees, clerks of court, probation officers, and United States commission-
ers.”  28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(3). 
 21. See, e.g., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: JULY 1, 1968-MARCH 1, 1969, at 4-5 [hereinafter SECOND 
4
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss1/8
No. 1] Judging as Judgment 133 
federal appellate judges.
22
  These programs expanded in subsequent years, and 




The success of the Joint Committee, National College, and Federal Judicial 
Center, along with NYU’s Institute of Judicial Administration, ignited a much 
wider enthusiasm for judicial education.  The National Academy of Judicial Edu-
cation was formed in 1969 to provide training and education for judges sitting on 
state courts of limited jurisdiction, and the National Center for State Courts was 
established in 1971 to provide services to state courts similar to those the FJC 
offered federal courts.
24
  In addition, individual states established their own pro-
grams.  For example, a new center in California held an orientation program in 
1976, and Michigan started offering judicial education in 1977.
25
  By 1986, all 
fifty states were involved in providing some form of education for judges.
26
 
The rapidity with which judicial education took hold in the 1960s is quite re-
markable.  In roughly a decade, the state of judicial education in the United States 
was transformed from a few sporadic offerings and a regular summer seminar at 
NYU into a vibrant and expanding field with a multitude of institutionalized pro-
grams.  The following section offers an explanation for why these developments 
occurred when they did, an explanation that features prevailing ideas and beliefs 
about law and adjudication. 
B.  Why the 1960s? 
Many factors converged to make the 1960s a propitious time for mobilizing 
interest in judicial education.  First, concerns about court congestion and delay 
highlighted problems with judicial administration, which in turn sparked interest 
in education as a way to encourage reform.  Second, Associate Justice Tom Clark 
                                                          
ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting that in 1968, its first year of operation, the FJC assisted the Judicial 
Conference’s Committee on Trial Practice and Techniques with three seminars for newly appointed 
federal district judges); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 25-26 (reporting that the FJC held two multi-day semi-
nars for newly appointed district court judges as well as a number of seminars for district court clerks, 
magistrate judges, and other personnel) available at http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc_catalog.nsf/autofra 
mepage?openform&url=/library/fjc_catalog.nsf/bycollectionfrm?openform&category=Federal+Judicia
l+Center+Annual+Reports. 
 22. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1973, at 21, available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/annrep73.pdf/$file/ 
annrep73.pdf. 
 23. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2013, at 5, available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/annrep13.pdf/$file/ 
annrep13.pdf. 
 24. See Cady & Coe, supra note 7, at 441-52 (describing the various national organizations involved 
in judicial education). 
 25. LIVINGSTON ARMYTAGE, EDUCATING JUDGES: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF CONTINUING 
JUDICIAL LEARNING 13 (1996).  Two authors reported in 1975 that “[t]he great majority of states are 
conducting some form of continuing judicial education,” although they also noted that “there are few 
state orientation programs for new judges.”  Cady & Coe, supra note 7, at 431, 438. 
 26. L. ARMYTAGE, supra note 25, at 13.  In 1977, “all but five states provide[d] training programs 
for their judiciary,” and “mandatory requirements exist[ed] in 23 states.”  Larry Berkson & Lenore 
Haggard, The Education and Training of Judges in the United States, in MANAGING THE STATE 
COURTS 142, 147 (1977).  As judicial education became more prevalent on the state level, those in-
volved eventually formed their own national association, the State Judicial Educators Association.  
Cady & Coe, supra note 7, at 452. 
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became involved in the judicial education movement during the 1960s and his 
energy and leadership built enthusiasm and mobilized broad-based support.  
Third, and most important for this Article, the intellectual climate of the 1950s 
and 1960s provided a favorable mix of ideas and beliefs that made sense of judi-
cial education as a way to achieve effective court reform. 
1.  Congestion and Delay 
Concerns about case backlog and court congestion intensified during the 
1960s.
27
  One report cited a 55% increase in the number of civil cases filed in 
federal district courts between 1960 and 1969, and a 19% increase in the number 
of criminal cases.
28
  State courts, too, suffered from congestion and delay, espe-
cially in metropolitan areas.  Commentators at the time identified several causes:  
increasing population, a sharp rise in automobile accident litigation,
29
 new and 
expanded statutory and common law causes of action, more intensive regulation, a 
growing docket of civil rights cases (it was the 1960s after all), and a major in-
crease in habeas corpus petitions and draft- and immigration-related criminal 
cases.
30
  In fact, the situation was so serious that some proclaimed a “crisis in the 
courts.”31 
Congress responded to this crisis on the federal level by adding more district 
court judgeships:  63 new judges were added in 1961, 35 in 1966, and 61 in 
1970.
32
  But adding new judgeships also created new sources of delay and cost.
33
  
Local districts, for example, had to accommodate the influx of additional judges 
and adjust to a larger court.
34
  Moreover, with reduced congestion and delay, cases 
                                                          
 27. See, e.g., Earl Warren, Administrative Problems of the Federal Judiciary, 23 BUS. LAW. 7, 8-10 
(1967) (describing problems in state and federal courts).  For a discussion of these problems at the 
federal court level, see Beverly Blair Cook, The Socialization of New Federal Judges: Impact on 
District Court Business, 1971 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 258-59 (1971); Tom C. Clark, Judicial Reform: 
A Symposium – Introduction, 23 FLA. L. REV. 217 (1971).  For a discussion of the problems at the state 
court level, see Alfred T. Sulmonetti, Let’s Put Our Judicial House in Order, 6 TRIAL JUDGES’ J. 1, 24 
(1967) (“legal periodicals reveal numerous articles on the subject ‘Crisis in the Courts’”); Joseph R. 
Weisberger, Court Administration: A Challenging Dilemma, 6 TRIAL JUDGES’ J. 26 (1967) (officials 
and citizens “deplore the ever-increasing backlog and congestion in the litigation process” of state trial 
courts). 
 28. Cook, supra note 27, at 258. 
 29. Charles S. Desmond, The Courts, The Public, and The Law Explosion: A Critique, 54 GEO. L.J. 
777, 791 (1966) (“everyone knows that the delay problem in the [state] civil trial courts is related 
almost entirely to highway accident cases”). 
 30. See, e.g., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 16 (about a third of the federal district 
court docket involves Section 2254 habeas applications by prisoners); Cook supra note 27, at 258-59 
(listing some of the causes for federal courts); Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limita-
tions and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 567 (1967) (noting the seriousness of the congestion and delay 
problem for federal and state courts); Weisberger, supra note 27, at 26 (noting the huge burden im-
posed on state trial courts by automobile cases caused by “the burgeoning of motor vehicle traffic, 
coupled with higher speeds and complicated traffic patterns”).  Additionally, federal courts had to deal 
with more complex and burdensome forms of litigation made possible by the liberal joinder provisions 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Resnik, supra note 6, at 944-45. 
 31. See Sulmonetti, supra note 27, at 24. 
 32. Cook, supra note 27, at 260. 
 33. Id. at 259 (“creating new judgeships in an effort to relieve the courts of external pressure tempo-
rarily adds to their burden”). 
 34. Id. at 263 (remarking on the need for coordination, and noting there were only 29 single-judge 
districts in 1949, and only four after 1970). 
6
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at the margin became more valuable and thus worth filing, which increased the 
volume of litigation and diluted some of the congestion-reducing benefits of a 
larger judiciary.
35
  As a result, many commentators at the time felt that adding 
judges could not, by itself, solve congestion and delay problems.
36
  In their view, 
it was also necessary to reform the courts by enhancing the efficiency of judicial 
administration.
37
  Proposed reforms included such things as improved information 
management systems, better budgeting, a more professional administrative staff, 
and better case management techniques, opinion drafting, and so on.
38
 
Education played an important role in this reform strategy.  It was through ju-
dicial education that sitting judges could be persuaded to use, and new judges 
trained in the use of, more efficient administrative and management methods.
39
  In 
sum, widespread perception of serious congestion and delay problems sparked 
interest in judicial administration, which in turn highlighted the value of judicial 
education. 
However, this cannot be the entire explanation for the rise of judicial educa-
tion.  Complaints about serious congestion and delay were hardly new to the 
1960s.  Jurists raised these concerns in the first few decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, and all the way back into the nineteenth century as well.  Roscoe Pound, for 
example, cited serious court congestion and delay in his famous 1906 address to 
the American Bar Association,
40
 which helped to catalyze the procedural reform 
movement of the 1920s and 1930s.
41
  Yet in none of these earlier periods was 
judicial education considered an important part of the solution. 
More generally, congestion and delay are inevitable features of any court sys-
tem:  unresolved cases always wait in the wings, adjudication always takes time, 
and litigation always generates costs.  These features become problems only rela-
tive to some normative baseline of what a properly functioning court system 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 259. 
 36. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 27, at 221 (“While some jurisdictions do need more judges, experi-
ence teaches that the omnibus creation of new judgeships has not been the answer.”); Maurice Rosen-
berg, Frank Talk on Improving the Administration of Justice, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1033-34 (1969). 
 37. Judicial administration included such things as the “structure, organization, and personnel of the 
courts, and . . . their operations in terms of administration and management,” as well as “reform in 
procedural law.”  Robert C. Finley, Judicial Administration: What is This Thing called Legal Reform?, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 571 (1965). 
 38. See, e.g., ERNEST C. FRIESEN, JR., EDWARD C. GALLAS & NESTA M. GALLAS, MANAGING THE 
COURTS (1971); Clark, supra note 27, at 221 (“What is needed is a more efficient judge and staff 
operation plus a modernization of facilities and equipment.”). 
 39. See Finley, supra note 37, at 572-73, 575 (arguing that judicial education is an important part of 
court reform, for it teaches judges current ideas about legal reform and provides opportunities for them 
to “seek solutions to common problems by sharing common experiences and wider dissemination of 
ideas”). 
 40. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 
A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).  Indeed, some reformers in the 1960s and 1970s pointed to Pound’s speech as 
an early call for modernized judicial administration, a call that went largely unheeded.  See, e.g., E. C. 
FRIESEN ET AL., supra note 38, at 4-5 (“The focus of attention for most of the six decades since 
Pound’s speech has not been on court mismanagement.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit 
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1989) [hereinafter 
Bone, Mapping].  Notably, the automobile played an important role in the 1920s and 1930s, just as it 
did in the 1960s.  The invention of the automobile created new risks that produced a flood of tort cases 
burdening state courts.  See Robert G. Bone, Procedural Reform in a Local Context: The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court and the Federal Rule Model, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN 
MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 1692-1992, at 393, 402-06 (1992). 
7
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should be doing.  It is the baseline that makes the queue seem too long, litigation 
too protracted, and cases too costly.
42
   Thus, the important question has to do with 
defining this baseline, and the answer necessarily depends on a theory of adjudica-
tion.  In other words, congestion and delay become serious problems only because 
critics have some reason to believe that courts can and should do better, and those 
beliefs depend on a conception of what courts should be doing, that is, on a theory 
of adjudication, expressly or implicitly held. 
2.  Leadership:  The Role of Justice Tom Clark 
Another factor contributing to the rise of judicial education in the 1960s in-
volved the leadership of Justice Tom Clark.
43
  Clark, an Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court from 1949 to 1967, threw himself into the project of 
court reform and judicial education with extraordinary zeal.
44
  As chair of the 
ABA Section of Judicial Administration in 1958, he played a critical role in estab-
lishing the National Conference of State Trial Judges, which later helped to create 
state judicial education programs.
45
  Most importantly, he chaired the Joint Com-
mittee for Effective Administration of Justice during the crucial period (1961-
1964) that catalyzed the judicial education movement.
46
  He was also a leading 
figure in establishing the National College of Trial Judges and chaired its Board of 
Directors.
47
  And he served as the first director of the Federal Judicial Center.
48
 
Clark’s combination of energy, enthusiasm, and commitment, together with 
his reputation as a Supreme Court Justice, no doubt helped secure the critical 
funding and cooperation essential for building momentum in favor of judicial 
education.
49
  Still, Clark’s leadership cannot alone account for the rise of judicial 
education in the 1960s.  Clark succeeded because others also believed in its im-
portance.  He doubtless inspired many to become involved, but it is hard to imag-
ine he would have invested the time and effort he did if he were not confident that 
his efforts would be rewarded.  The question remains:  What was it about the 
1960s that supported this level of confidence and commitment? 
                                                          
 42. See Bone, Mapping, supra note 41, at 4-5. 
 43. See John P. Frank, Justice Tom Clark and Judicial Administration, 46 TEX. L. REV. 5, 7 (1967) 
(referring to Clark as the “No. 1 executive in adult education in the United States”); Frank R. Kenison, 
The Continuing Contribution of Robert A. Leflar to the Judicial Education of Appellate Judges, 25 
ARK. L. REV. 95, 98 (1971) (noting that Tom Clark’s “monumental contribution to judicial education 
at all levels cannot go unmentioned”). 
 44. He had a lengthy record of involvement in matters of judicial administration.  See Frank, supra 
note 43, at 8. 
 45. Id. at 14-15, 22-23. 
 46. Id. at 17-20.  See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.  Justice Tom Clark was also respon-
sible for organizing Projective Effective Justice in 1961, the umbrella group coordinating the different 
organizations working on judicial administration. 
 47. Frank, supra note 43, at 7, 23-26 (referring to this accomplishment as “one of the most important 
tasks Clark had ever undertaken”); Kenison, supra note 43, at 98. 
 48. See Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 1032 (“Federal judges and their supporting personnel will soon 
have an opportunity to take part in a training program designed by the new Federal Judicial Center 
under the directorship of Justice Tom C. Clark, the guiding light of the State Trial Judges College.”). 
 49. See Frank, supra note 43, at 35-46. 
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3.  The Intellectual Climate 
I believe that a large part of the reason why the 1960s was such a propitious 
time for judicial education has to do with prevailing ideas about law, courts, and 
adjudication.  Two aspects are particularly salient:  the popularity of process juris-
prudence, and the rise of management science after World War Two.  Process 
jurisprudence focused attention on institutional design, and the teachings of man-
agement science instilled confidence that judicial institutions could be made more 
efficient.  These beliefs together pushed judicial administration to the forefront 
and focused attention on education as the way to mobilize broad-based support for 
reform. 
The following discussion describes how process jurisprudence and manage-
ment science combined to shape the reform agenda of the 1960s.  Before proceed-
ing, a word of caution is in order.  Reformers rarely discussed their normative 
views with care and this makes it difficult to support strong causal claims.  As a 
result, my argument is based mostly on correlation.  I claim that process jurispru-
dence was a key element of legal thought during the relevant period, that the ideas 
behind management science and operations research were in the air and likely 
known to many jurists, and that the mix of the two nicely fits the reform agenda 
and the enthusiasm for judicial education at the time. 
a.  Process Jurisprudence 
Process jurisprudence had a major impact on the law during the 1950s and 
1960s.
50
  It emerged partly in response to the legal realist movement of the 1920s 
and 1930s and partly as a reaction to World War Two.
51
  Its major figures includ-
ed Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, and the legal philosopher Lon Fuller.
52
  Hart and 
Sacks wrote the canonical text, The Legal Process: Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law, which was taught to several generations of law students from 
the mid-1950s through much of the 1960s.
53
 
This is not the place to delve into the details of process jurisprudence.  Brief-
ly, it is known for its focus on procedure and institutional design and its commit-
                                                          
 50. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The 
Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW lii, cii-civ (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction].  Some refer to process jurisprudence as “legal 
process” or the “legal process school.”  Id. at lii. 
 51. For accounts of process jurisprudence and its relationship to legal realism and the World War 
Two experience with totalitarianism, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 253-58 (1992); G. Edward White, The Evolution 
of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 282-85 
(1973) (tracing reactions to totalitarianism back to the late 1930s). 
 52. See M. J. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 254; Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication 
and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 1273, 1276 (1995). 
 53. M. J. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 254.  The Legal Process materials, although not formally 
published at the time, were widely circulated.  They were finally published in 1994.  See Eskridge & 
Frickey, Introduction, supra note 50, at vii-ix. 
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ment to reasoned elaboration in the law.
54
  It is the focus on institutional design 
that fits the preoccupation with judicial administration and court reform during the 
1960s.  In particular, process jurists were deeply concerned about institutional 
competence and focused on assigning substantive decisions to the institutions best 
suited to handle them.
55
  As for civil adjudication, Lon Fuller argued that adjudi-
cation evolved gradually to resolve disputes involving claims of right and as a 
result had developed structural features, such as adversarialism and a commitment 
to principled decision making and reasoned argument, which suited it well to per-
form its rights-deciding function.
56
 
Process jurisprudence differed in significant ways from the legal realism of 
the 1920s and 1930s.  The legal realists were concerned at least as much with 
substantive law reform as with legal process.
57
  By contrast, process jurists fo-
cused mostly on process and institutional design.  This shift in emphasis reflects a 
change in beliefs about law and society.
58
  Process jurists worried more than their 
realist predecessors about value conflict in a pluralist society and the problems it 
created for substantive law.
59
  Moreover, they conceived of regulation in a more 
                                                          
 54. See White, supra note 51.  Professors Eskridge and Frickey, the editors of the published Hart 
and Sacks Legal Process materials, describe distinctive elements of the “legal process vision” in the 
following way: 
The strengths of the legal process vision were its insistence that law is accountable to reason 
and not just fiat, its claim that institutional architecture and procedure are both critical to 
law’s operation and can be analyzed systematically, and its consideration of legal doctrine in 
light of law’s purposes and the polity’s underlying principles.  Its main weaknesses were its 
polarized categorizations (e.g., substance/procedure), its undue optimism about the compe-
tence and public-spiritedness of state institutions, and its failure to recognize the ideological 
and non-neutral nature of its own positions. 
Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 50, at civ; see also id. at xcii-xcvi. 
 55. See M. J. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 254 (noting that for Process jurists, “the task was to har-
ness and channel that legal discretion through institutional arrangements” and that they focused on 
“institutional competence”); Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 50, at xciii (noting that Hart 
and Sacks were concerned with allocating the roles of private and public institutions in the ordering of 
society “according to their relative ‘competence’ to handle the matter”). 
 56. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 52, at 1301-10 (arguing that Lon Fuller’s theory of natural ordering 
principles for institutions fits with his theory of adjudication based on reasoned argument in an adver-
sarial setting).  By contrast, Fuller believed that complex polycentric problems involving difficult 
tradeoffs were best left to agencies or to the market.  Id. at 1314-20. 
 57. For a sampling of the vast literature on sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, see GRANT 
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 68-111 (1977); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 
1927-1960 (1986); M. J. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 169-246; ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); and G. Edward White, From Sociological 
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. 
REV. 999 (1972). 
 58. There is always a risk in dividing intellectual history into sharply defined periods.  Many of the 
ideas that informed process jurisprudence had been around for some time before process jurisprudence 
seized on them.  Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 50, at lxcvii-lxxxv.  Still, the Legal 
Process School of the 1950s placed its own gloss on these ideas and organized them in a distinctive 
way that had a major impact on lawyers, judges, and academics during the period. 
 59. See, e.g., Frank R. Kenison, Some Preliminary Observations on the State Appellate Judge To-
day, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 792, 793 (1961) (stressing complexity and value conflict when describing the 
challenge facing state appellate judges in the twentieth century: “competing factors and conflicting 
values are more diverse and change becomes more constant”).  The legal realists assumed social prac-
tice embodied a working balance among conflicting values, and as a result, they relied heavily on 
custom and convention as a source of law.  See generally Bone, Mapping, supra note 41, at 97 n.332 
(describing the belief in an immanent social order).  For example, if sellers in a particular industry 
followed informal norms that seemed to work well in practice, this in itself was a good reason to in-
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complex and dynamic way.  Legal realists tended to assume that law regulated 
society directly by commanding results and sanctioning noncompliance.  Process 
jurists instead believed that law and society interacted dynamically, each influenc-
ing the other in a continual process of mutual adjustment.  For process jurists, 
legal rules created feedback effects that altered the practice being regulated, and 
the altered practice might then require changes in the legal rules regulating it.
60
 
Roughly speaking, institutional design in process jurisprudence was the key 
to managing value conflict and addressing regulatory complexity.
61
  The fact that 
a decision issued from a well-designed institution was thought by itself to vest the 
decision with legitimacy apart from the substantive values it implemented.  More-
over, well-designed institutions were thought capable of managing regulatory 
complexity and producing good decisions and rules in the long run.
62
  However, 
effective institutions were not designed from scratch; they evolved gradually in 
response to social need and, over time, acquired core features that equipped them 
to do their work well.  It followed then that anyone interested in institutional re-
form had to study existing institutions and respect the way those institutions actu-
ally worked in practice.  In other words, process jurists were institutional pragma-
tists: they believed that existing institutions held clues to how those same institu-
tions could be improved.
63
 
Process jurisprudence no longer has the force it once did.  Today, people dis-
agree sharply about questions of process design and those disagreements often 
reflect disputes over substantive values.  But during the 1960s, the ideas and be-
liefs associated with process jurisprudence made sense of focusing on judicial 
administration and procedure.  The commitment to the primacy of process and 
institutional design helps explain why lawyers and judges were willing to invest 
so much time and effort in improving the courts.
64
  For process jurists, courts were 
key institutions in society committed to the application of principled reasoning, 
and their proper functioning was essential to the efficacy and legitimacy of the 
decisions and common law rules they produced. 
                                                          
corporate those norms into the law.  One of the most notable examples can be found in Karl Llewel-
lyn’s drafting of the original Sales Act.  See Zipporah Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn 
and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
 60. As a result, a rule seemingly optimal when first adopted can turn out badly later when the prac-
tice being regulated changes in response to it.  See Bone, supra note 52, at 1286-88, 1292-97. 
 61. Id.; see Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 50, at xci-xcii. 
 62. Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 50, at xciv-xcvi. 
 63. Lon Fuller derived adjudication’s function and its core features—party participation through 
reasoned argument in an adversarial setting—by considering the way adjudication actually worked in 
practice.  See Bone, supra note 52, at 1301-10. 
 64. It might seem obvious that jurists worried about court congestion and delay would focus on 
judicial administration.  But it was not so obvious at the time.  Some critics advocated other approach-
es and some questioned whether reforming judicial administration could do the job.  For example, 
there was some discussion about transferring automobile accident litigation, the chief cause of state 
court congestion, to an administrative process, or even adopting no-fault insurance.  The Columbia 
University Project for Effective Justice conducted empirical studies to test the efficacy of some of the 
proposed reforms, and one author writing in 1965 described the results as revealing that “even modest 
gains were difficult to achieve in the field of judicial administration.”  Finley, supra note 37, at 575-76.  
In fact, Charles Alan Wright, a distinguished proceduralist, expressed grave doubt that reforms to 
judicial administration could ever succeed on their own to remedy congestion problems without a 
significant reduction in the volume of case filings.  Wright, supra note 30, at 568.  See also Desmond, 
supra note 29, at 77-78 (noting the persistence of serious delay in the courts despite the “remarkable 
improvements in court administration”). 
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Judicial education made sense as a key component of this reform program.  
Through judicial education classes, judges could be taught the importance of ad-
ministration and court reform.  They could also be inspired to try new ideas and 
methods and to experiment on their own.
65
  Moreover, the popular problem-and-
discussion format was thought to be a good way to learn what worked well in 
practice, since it encouraged judges to reveal ideas and techniques that they al-
ready used to good effect in their own courtrooms.
66
 
In theory at least, judicial education might have played a role in earlier reform 
campaigns, but the goals pursued by those campaigns did not clearly single out 
judicial education as part of the solution.  The legal realists, for example, focused 
on removing technical barriers that interfered with judges doing what they would 
otherwise do well.  They pushed for substantive reforms that freed judges to de-
cide cases on functional grounds,
67
 and they implemented procedural reforms that 
empowered judges to exercise discretion unencumbered by common law techni-
cality.
68
  There is no obvious reason why realists committed to these goals should 
think that judicial education had any particular role to play; their vision assumed 




                                                          
 65. See Finley, supra note 37, at 572-75.  The content of many courses offered in the 1960s reflect 
favorite legal process themes, such as statutory interpretation, the function of concurrences and dis-
sents, the nature of appellate review, the function of precedent and stare decisis, the nature of the 
judicial process, and the relationship between federal and state courts.  See, e.g., Burger, supra note 9, 
at 144-46 (noting that the first five years of the NYU Appellate Judges seminar focused on classes 
addressing opinion writing, the nature and function of the judicial process, and the relationship be-
tween state and federal courts); Kenison, supra note 43, at 101-02 (listing topics of recurrent interest to 
judges participating in the NYU seminar); Robert A. Leflar, The Quality of Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289, 
302-03 (1960) (listing some of these topics). 
 66. The problem-and-discussion format was very popular at the time.  See, e.g., JUDICIAL 
EDUCATION SURVEY, supra note 14, at 49-51 (describing the NYU Appellate Judges seminar); Karlen, 
supra note 2, at 1050-51 (noting that in the NYU program, “everyone sits around one large table and 
discussion is free and uninhibited,” and describing the programs put on by the Joint Committee for the 
Effective Administration of Justice as discussion-based); Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 344-45 (describ-
ing the problem-and-discussion format used by the National College of State Trial Judges).  Moreover, 
the problem-and-discussion approach was explicitly justified as a way to encourage sharing of ideas.  
See, e.g., DELMAR KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 48 (1970) 
(through judicial education “experienced judges are given an opportunity . . . to share ideas and in-
sights”); THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (1970) [hereinafter THIRD ANNUAL REPORT] (noting the usefulness of the 
“continuing seminar program” as a device to “uncover the techniques and procedures which are pres-
ently available and in use by some courts and by some judges” in order to “measure and evaluate them, 
and recommend them for adoption by other courts and judges”); Burger, supra note 9, at 147 (stressing 
the interchange of ideas); Kenison, supra note 43, at 98-99 (Karl Llewellyn “spotted a deficiency in 
judicial education prior to 1960” and complained about the failure of appellate judges “to get together 
into any pooling of their craft wisdom”); Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 343 (the active “stimulation of 
insights and perspectives” is one of the main objectives of the judicial education programs put on by 
the National College). 
 67. See M. J. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 198-206. 
 68. See Bone, Mapping, supra note 41, at 98-103. 
 69. I am not suggesting that judicial education had nothing at all to offer the legal realists.  Rather, 
my point is that the nature of the realist agenda did not point strongly to judicial education as part of 
the solution, at least not as strongly as it did for reformers in the 1960s. 
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b.  Management Science 
Management science is the study of the principles and methods for making 
optimal management decisions within budgetary, personnel, and other constraints.  
While those in the field trace its early history back to the late nineteenth century, it 
was not until the 1950s that management science established itself as a major area 
of inquiry.
70
  Enthusiasm for the discipline—and for the related fields of opera-
tions research and systems analysis—grew rapidly after the Second World War, 
fueled in part by the military success of operations research during the War.
71
  
Those who promoted management science in the 1950s and 1960s conceived of 
the field as more than a collection of tools for solving complex organizational 
problems.  They thought of it as a scientific discipline committed to discovering 
general principles of sound management.
72
  Moreover, interest in the field was not 
just theoretical.  The principles of management science were applied in business 
and industry.
73
  Some corporations even created their own internal “operations 
research groups” to apply those principles to concrete business problems.74 
Although there are few explicit references to “management science,” “opera-
tions research,” or “systems analysis” in the legal literature of the 1960s, there is 
evidence that at least some of those involved with judicial administration were 
influenced by the ideas.  Moreover, given the prevalence of talk about efficiency 
and analogies to business, it is very likely that many more were caught up in the 
general enthusiasm for management reform.  In 1962, for example, a law profes-
sor writing about teaching jurisprudence in regular courses identified “Operations 
Research and Management Science” as the jurisprudential core of a course in 
procedure and judicial administration.
75
  In 1967, Joseph Tydings, a Senator from 
Maryland, gave a speech, “Modernizing Our Courts,” in which he championed 
management science as the key to improving judicial administration: 
                                                          
 70. The origins of management science can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries when Frederick Winslow Taylor, Lillien Gilbreth, and others applied quantitative methods to 
business problems.  See DANIEL WREN, THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT THOUGHT 104-55 (3rd ed. 
1987); Sunil Chopra et al., Five Decades of Operations Management and the Prospects Ahead, 50 
MGMT. SCIENCE 8, 8 (2004).  The field really took off after the Second World War with the creation of 
the Institute of Management Sciences in 1953.  See Wallace J. Hopp, Fifty Years of Management 
Science, 50 MGMT. SCIENCE 1, 1 (2004).  One of the reasons for the enthusiasm in the 1950s had to do 
with the success of a closely-related field, operations research, in solving complex military problems 
during World War Two.  Id. (stating that these events were “the Big Bang”). 
 71. See D. WREN, supra note 70, at 308-10, 348-69. 
 72. At the first national meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences in 1955, the editor of 
Management Science, the premier journal in the field, declared his conviction that “a science of man-
agement will stand as a legitimate and recognized field of scientific endeavor” and “no other field of 
endeavor is as important to man as the field which searches for truths about the ways in which men 
work and live together.”  Hopp, supra note 70, at 2 (quoting C.W. Churchman, Management Science, 
the Journal, 1 MGMT. SCI. 187, 187-88 (1955)); see also id. (quoting one of the founders of the Insti-
tute as saying that it was grounded in a vision of management science “modeled more on the lines of 
‘science-type’ activities such as discovering and formulating ‘laws of behavior’ (quoting W.W. 
Cooper, The Founding of TIMS, 2002 INTERFACES 1, available at, www.interfaces.pubs.informs.org)). 
 73. In fact, a new journal, Management Technology, was created in 1960 as a vehicle for publishing 
articles about practical applications.  Moreover, when the journal Management Science took over 
Management Technology in 1965, the issues alternated between pure science and practical application.  
Hopp, supra note 70, at 4. 
 74. See Chopra et al., supra note 70, at 9. 
 75. Thomas A. Cowan, Notes on the Teaching of Jurisprudence, 15 J. LEG. ED. 1, 2 (1962). 
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In aid of . . . sound judicial administration . . . we in this century have the 
opportunity to utilize the skills and techniques developed by management 
experts.  Commerce and industry have drawn liberally upon these sources 
to achieve the more efficient use of their resources.  It is time for the 
courts to make use of the advances in management science as well.  With 
proper guidance from lawyers and judges, there is every reason to expect 
that management consultants can streamline court administration without 




I am not suggesting jurists drew directly on management science principles 
and methods, although some evidently did.  My claim is that enthusiasm for man-
agement science influenced the reform movement by way of inspiration and anal-
ogy.  In particular, it inspired confidence that the court system could be organized 
in an efficient way, and it guided the formulation of reform proposals by support-
ing analogies to developments in business and other management sectors.
77
  In-
deed, it was quite common for jurists during the 1960s to point to business effi-
ciency as an ideal for judicial efficiency.
78
 
Here too, judicial education fit into the picture as a way to teach specific 
management techniques and to prime judges to look for more efficient methods in 
practice.
79
  Through judicial education courses, judges were supposed to learn the 
value of efficient court organization and the importance of actively managing 
litigation rather than deferring to lawyers and parties.
80
 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS 
The history recounted in Part I offers lessons for judicial education today.  As 
we have seen, judicial education emerged in the 1960s as part of a court reform 
movement, and it was influenced by ideas and beliefs that prevailed at the time.  
These particular beliefs no longer have the force they once did.  Process jurispru-
dence came under attack in the 1970s, and the idea that management science in-
cludes objective truths about institutional design seems misguided today.  Howev-
er, the notion that judicial education must be tied to beliefs about adjudication still 
holds true.  Before deciding what judges should be learning, one must first under-
                                                          
 76. Joseph P. Tydings, Modernizing Our Courts, 4 GA. ST. BAR J. 84, 88 (1967); see also E. C. 
FRIESEN ET AL., supra note 38, at 10-14, 19-22 (urging an interdisciplinary approach and the applica-
tion of modern management science and systems analysis to court administration); Maurice Rosen-
berg, Devising Procedures That are Civil to Promote Justice that is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 
798-99 (1971) (noting that visitors from Japan interested in American efforts to improve judicial ad-
ministration inquired about “the adaptability of management science principles to the courts”). 
 77. See, e.g., E. C. FRIESEN ET AL., supra note 38, at 10-14. 
 78. See, e.g., THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 1 (quoting Chief Justice Burger as criticiz-
ing the courts for not applying “the techniques of modern business”); Tydings, supra note 76, at 88. 
 79. See THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 1 (“we know that the absolute prerequisite for 
efficient management of the work of any court is control by the court”); Burger, supra note 9, at 144-
45 (appellate court machinery “will no more run itself than could a law firm of comparable size with-
out executive committees, personnel committees, managing partners . . .”). 
 80. See Clark, supra note 27, at 218, 220 (emphasizing that trial judge control over litigation is 
essential).  See generally Resnik, supra note 6, at 944-49 (describing the emphasis on case manage-
ment in judicial education courses for trial judges). 
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stand what judges should be doing, and that requires a theory of courts, adjudica-
tion, and good judging.  Part III examines this point more closely and makes the 
case for face-to-face, in-person teaching as a way to engage judges in reflecting 
critically on these jurisprudential issues.  Before proceeding, however, it will be 
useful to have a general sense of the types of courses taught to judges these days.  
This Part II lays that foundation.
81
 
The offerings are vast.  There are programs for federal judges and programs 
for state judges; programs for administrative law judges and programs for tribal 
court judges.  There are programs for trial judges and for appellate judges, and for 
sitting judges as well as new judges.  These programs vary from state to state and 
across different types of courts within a state.  The following brief overview or-
ganizes the courses into four broad categories useful for the analysis in Part III:  
(1) those that teach specific areas of substantive or procedural law, (2) those that 
teach process and management skills, (3) those that address broader jurispruden-
tial and theoretical topics, and (4) those that teach non-legal technical knowledge 
and skills.  A caveat is in order at the outset.  I made no effort to obtain course 
syllabi or course materials, so the following discussion relies on course titles to 
identify content. 
A.  Specific Substantive and Procedural Law Areas 
Many judicial education courses cover specific areas of substantive or proce-
dural law.  For example, the 2014 catalog of the National Judicial College in-
cludes courses entitled “Selected Criminal Evidence Issues,” “General Jurisdic-
tion,” “Fourth Amendment,” “Advanced Evidence,” and the like.82  The Federal 
Judicial Center offers a two-stage orientation program for newly appointed federal 
judges, which covers evidence rules, civil rights litigation, employment discrimi-
nation, and other substantive topics.
83
  And the Federal Judicial Center’s continu-
ing education program for sitting federal judges includes specialized workshops in 
intellectual property and employment law, as well as periodic workshops that 
focus on new legal developments.
84
 
Even the NYU New Appellate Judges Seminar for 2014 lists what appear to 
be two substantive courses alongside what is mostly a skills-and-theory-oriented 
curriculum.
85
  Finally, an extensive report on judicial education written by Profes-
sors Catherine White and Maureen Conner and published by the Judicial Educa-
tion Reference, Information, and Technical Transfer Project (the “White-Conner 
                                                          
 81. For a comprehensive survey of judicial education programs as of 2005, see Catherine M. White 
& Maureen E. Conner, Issues and Trends in Judicial Branch Education 2005, JUD. EDUC. REFERENCE 
INFO. & TECHNICAL TRANSFER PROJECT (2005) [hereinafter White & Conner, ISSUES AND TRENDS]. 
 82. 2014 Courses (Alphabetical Listing), THE NAT’L JUDICIAL COLL., http://www.judges. 
org/courses/courses-2014-alpha.html [hereinafter 2014 NJC Courses]. 
 83. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER: EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FOR THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 
(2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/About_FJC_English_2010_July.pdf 
/$file/About_FJC_English_2010_July.pdf [hereinafter FJC EDUCATION AND RESEARCH]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. The two substantive courses are “Current Problems in Criminal Law” and “Issues in Judicial 
Ethics and Judicial Independence.”  See New Appellate Judges Seminar: July 13-18, 2014, available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/2014%20AJS%20Agenda.pdf [hereinaf-
ter 2014 NYU Seminar]. 
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Report”) lists many courses offered between 1990 and 2004 that appear to focus 
on substantive and procedural law topics.
86
 
B.  Process and Management Skills 
The second category, which includes courses in process and management 
skills, is well represented among current educational offerings.  For example, the 
National Judicial College offers courses in mediation (“Civil Mediation”) and trial 
management (“Conducting the Trial”) as well as courses entitled “Advanced 
Skills for Appellate Judges,” “Dispute Resolution Skills,” and “Management 
Skills for Presiding Judges.”87  The Federal Judicial Center also offers skills-based 
workshops and seminars, including training in settlement and the use of ADR.
88
 
In addition, the NYU Appellate Judges Seminar includes several sessions en-
titled “Opinion Writing” as well as a session on “Statutory Interpretation.”89  And 
the White-Conner Report, summarizing educational offerings nationwide, lists 
broad subject matter categories that are obviously skills-oriented, such as “Com-
munication Skills: Verbal, Nonverbal, and Written” and “Court Administration, 
Management, and Leadership.”90 
C.  Jurisprudence and Theory 
The third category focuses on the jurisprudential or theoretical dimensions of 
judging.  I could not find many courses of this sort.  Based on titles, it appears that 
four of the forty-nine courses offered by The National Judicial College in 2014 
belong to this category:  “Decision Making,” “Judicial Philosophy and American 
Law,” “Logic and Opinion Writing” (which appears to cover more than just writ-
ing skills), and “Today’s Justice: The Historic Bases.”91  The Federal Judicial 
Center offers classes on the judicial process and federalism.
92
  The NYU Appel-
late Judges Seminar includes a course entitled “The Decisional Process” and an-
other entitled “Processes of Decision-Making,” both of which may have a substan-
tial theory component.
93
  And the White-Conner Report includes a few broad sub-
ject matter classifications and topic areas that seem relevant.
94
 
                                                          
 86. See White & Conner, ISSUES AND TRENDS, supra note 81, at 157-73. 
 87. See 2014 NJC Courses, supra note 82. 
 88. See FJC EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, supra note 83. 
 89. See 2014 NYU Seminar, supra note 85. 
 90. See White & Conner, ISSUES AND TRENDS, supra note 81, at 158-60, 173 (chart showing that 
26% of courses offered between 1990 and 2004 fit into these two broad categories). 
 91. 2014 NJC Courses, supra note 82. 
 92. See FJC EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, supra note 83. 
 93. See 2014 NYU Seminar, supra note 85. 
 94. For example, the subject matter category “Judicial Life and the Judicial Role and Responsibili-
ties” includes topics such as “Judicial Decision Making” and “Judicial Discretion” and the category 
“The Role of the Court in Society” includes a number of seemingly relevant topics.  See White & 
Conner, ISSUES AND TRENDS, supra note 81, at 166-67, 169-70, 173 (chart showing that 5% of courses 
offered between 1990 and 2004 fit into these categories). 
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D.  Non-Legal Technical Knowledge 
The fourth category includes courses centered on teaching various types of 
non-legal knowledge and skills, including economics, statistics, and specific tech-
nology areas (relevant, for example, to patent cases).  I was able to find only a few 
offerings of this sort.
95
  The Law and Economics Center at George Mason Law 
School organizes seminars for judges covering topics in economics, finance, and 
statistics.
96
  Additionally, the Federal Judicial Center once worked on software to 
teach statistics to judges, but eventually abandoned the effort.
97
 
III.  A NEW LOOK AT JUDICIAL EDUCATION 
There is something rather puzzling about the curricular choices summarized 
in Part II.  While lots of courses involve in-person, face-to-face instruction, the 
subject matter of many of them seems poorly suited to this teaching method.
98
  
The information taught is valuable, to be sure, but in-person, face-to-face instruc-
tion is not the best way to teach it. 
To illustrate, consider the first category:  courses teaching topics in substan-
tive and procedural law.
99
  It is difficult to imagine how a few hours of instruction 
concentrated into a few days could possibly provide sufficient information about 
complicated areas of substantive and procedural law—or facilitate sufficient re-
tention—to be all that helpful to busy judges over the long run.  A much better 
way to deliver this information is through web-based programming.  With access 
to web courses, judges can learn what they need to know at their own pace and 
when they need to know it.
100
 
The same is true for the fourth category, non-legal technical subject matter.  
This type of information is not easily taught in short courses.  Even if a judge 
grasps the main points of economics or statistics at the time she takes a course, she 
is very likely to forget what she has learned soon after the course ends.  These 
subjects are much better suited to web-based instruction.  With access to a web 
module, the judge can study the material when she has the time and review it as 
needed. 
The second category—process and management skills—requires a closer 
analysis.  In the 1960s, it made sense to teach national courses addressing topics in 
court management because people believed that the court system needed a major 
                                                          
 95. Nor could Judge Richard Posner, who remarked on their scarcity in a recent book.  R. POSNER, 
REFLECTIONS, supra note 5, at 331-50. 
 96. Mason Judicial Education Program, GEORGE MASON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW: LAW & ECONOMICS 
CTR., http://www.masonlec.org/programs/mason-judicial-education-program (last visited Sept. 3, 
2015. 
 97. See R. POSNER, REFLECTIONS, supra note 5, at 337. 
 98. To be sure, any opportunity to get together with colleagues can be valuable, but collegial interac-
tion takes place in lots of different settings.  Judicial education ought to be evaluated for its education-
al value. 
 99. Judges must learn this material, of course.  For instance, practicing lawyers and legal academics 
tend to be specialists before they become judges and they need to become familiar with a range of legal 
fields fairly rapidly, especially if they sit on courts of general jurisdiction.  Moreover, sitting judges 
must learn new areas of the law as their cases require it. 
 100. I am not an expert in adult learning theory, so these observations are based primarily on my 
experience as a teacher and a student. 
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overhaul and that there were ideal management principles to guide the effort.  
Today, court (as opposed to case) management, while still important, is probably a 
somewhat less pressing concern, and people are more skeptical about the exist-
ence of ideal management principles.  Moreover, much of court management to-
day is governed by local rules and practices, and this sort of information is better 
conveyed at the local level. 
This leaves process skills, such as opinion writing, and topics in case (as op-
posed to court) management, such as discovery supervision, settlement promotion, 
and the like.  A stronger argument can be made for the in-person teaching of these 
subjects.  But there is still a problem.  The problem is that people disagree about 
what should be taught.  For example, those who believe that court decisions 
should adhere strictly to formal law are likely to stress formalistic approaches in 
courses on judicial decision-making, whereas those who believe that moral princi-
ples or social policy should play an important role will favor a more functionally 
oriented curriculum.
101
  So too, those who champion settlement are likely to fea-
ture judicial settlement promotion in case management courses, whereas those 
who prefer trial will feature trial preparation more centrally.
102
 
Most importantly, these disagreements reflect deeper divisions over the prop-
er function of adjudication.  This means it is not possible to design a useful curric-
ulum without first deciding what judges should be doing—and that requires a 
theory of civil adjudication.  One cannot just teach everything and leave it to 
judges to choose among the various options; as I discuss below, what counts as 
proper adjudication is not simply a matter of personal preference.  In short, one 
must first know what judges should do before one can decide what they should be 
taught to do. 
This is where in-person, face-to-face instruction can make a valuable contri-
bution.  Guided group discussion through in-person instruction makes possible a 
collective process of critical reflection aimed at building a normatively attractive 
conception of adjudication and judging.  Jurisprudence and legal theory—the 
subjects in our third category—have an obvious role to play in this process, not 
merely as interesting intellectual diversions but as essential building blocks.  
Thus, the reason for engaging broad jurisprudential and theoretical questions 
about civil adjudication is to answer the very practical question of what judges 
should be doing in the litigation process, and this, in turn, informs the answer to 
the equally practical question of what process and case management skills judges 
should be taught. 
This is an ambitious undertaking, to be sure, and I shall have more to say 
about it in Section B below.  But it bears repeating that some effort of this kind is 
necessary if judges are to understand what they should be doing and how they can 
                                                          
 101. Justice Scalia is a well-known proponent of a more formalist approach.  And Judge Posner is a 
good example of a judge committed to a more functional approach.  See, e.g., R. POSNER, 
REFLECTIONS, supra note 5, at 105-30; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinaf-
ter R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE] (describing and defending a theory of law and legal decision that 
requires attention to moral principles). 
 102. Judicial enthusiasm for settlement promotion has been well documented.  See, e.g., Resnik, 
supra note 6, at 949.  It has also been criticized.  See, e.g., Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present 
Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745, 761-64 (2010).  In fact, there might be a 
trend in the opposite direction today, with more judges placing somewhat greater weight on the value 
of trial.  See Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Tr., 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 n.4 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting 
an incipient backlash). 
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do it well.  A judge can try to reach this understanding on her own, but, as I ex-
plain in Section B below, working it out with others in a group setting is likely to 
be more effective. 
Section A briefly describes several different adjudication theories with differ-
ent implications for how judges should handle cases and make decisions.  With 
this background in place, Section B then discusses the special value of judicial 
education classes conducted through in-person, face-to-face instruction. 
A.  Theories of Civil Adjudication 
By a theory of civil adjudication, I mean a general and internally coherent 
framework of values, concepts, and principles that explains the function of adjudi-
cation within the broader structure of legal and political institutions and ties that 
function to more concrete procedural elements.  The following discussion exam-
ines three different theories:  (1) a pragmatic theory advocated most recently by 
Judge Richard Posner, (2) an efficiency-based theory, and (3) a rights-based theo-
ry.  These are not the only possibilities, but they are the most common, and they 
have different implications for what judges should be taught. 
1.  Pragmatic Adjudication 
Pragmatism has had a major influence on civil adjudication in the United 
States, at least since the opening decades of the twentieth century.  For example, 
many legal realists in the 1930s were influenced by philosophical pragmatism, and 
the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect pragmatic beliefs.
103
  Rough-
ly speaking, a pragmatist believes that a good rule is one that works well in prac-
tice and, conversely, that the way a rule works in practice indicates whether it is 
good.
104
  Recently, Judge Richard Posner has championed his own brand of prag-
matism and applied it to judging.
105
  It is Posner’s theory that I focus on here. 
Posner describes the core of his pragmatism as “a disposition to base action 
on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms, generalities, and slo-
gans.”106  According to Posner, the pragmatic judge eschews “abstract moral and 
political theory” in favor of insights grounded in empirical fact.107  She also re-
jects formalist assumptions about the determinacy and sufficiency of existing law, 
instead embracing the realist view that cases should be decided with all relevant 
considerations in mind, including empirical effects.
108
  A Posnerian pragmatist is 
not wedded to existing law but follows it when the benefits of doing so are large 
                                                          
 103. See Bone, Mapping, supra note 41, at 80-98. 
 104. This is an admittedly rough description of pragmatism, but it captures the core idea—that ab-
stract concepts and norms have meaning only in terms of their practical, empirically-verifiable effects.  
Charles Peirce was one of the most important and influential figures in American philosophical prag-
matism.  See, e.g., Charles A. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in PRAGMATISM: THE CLASSIC 
WRITINGS 79, 88 (H. Thayer ed., 1982); The Fixation of Belief, in id. at 73-75, 77. 
 105. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter R. 
POSNER, PRAGMATISM]. 
 106. Id. at 3. 
 107. Id. at 60.  Posner’s pragmatism rejects dogmatic adherence to utilitarianism or any other philos-
ophy.  It accepts any theory that is useful for figuring out what to do as a practical matter.  Id. at 65, 
76-77. 
 108. R. POSNER, REFLECTIONS, supra note 5, at 105-30. 
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enough.
109




Posner insists that his pragmatism aligns with no particular normative theory.  
Even so, his examples tend to have a utilitarian bent, which is hardly surprising 
given Judge Posner’s background.  For example, a Posnerian judge is likely to 
support class certification when large-scale case aggregation yields substantial 
social benefits in resolving common questions or achieving deterrence.
111
 
In a recent book, Judge Posner discusses some of the implications of his 
pragmatic approach for judicial education.
112
  He is highly critical of the current 
focus on legal doctrine and recommends teaching judges the tools they need to 
handle increasingly complex cases, such as how to deal with statistical-type anal-
yses and the relevance of various aspects of decision theory to adjudication.
113
  
Notably, very few, if any, of the subjects Posner includes in his preferred curricu-
lum lend themselves to short-term, in-person classes.
114
 
2.  Normatively-Directed Adjudication Theories 
The problem with Posner’s pragmatic theory as an account of American adju-
dication is that it lacks normative direction.  Posner’s theory focuses mainly on 
                                                          
 109. These benefits include such things as predictability, continuity, impartiality, and decisional 
efficiency.  R. POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 105, at 61-64. 
 110. Id. at 64-65, 73.  At the same time, it is important to note that pragmatic judging involves much 
more than subjective intuition.  The difference between pragmatism and intuitionism is often misun-
derstood, and in the law this misunderstanding has been compounded by confusion over the nature of 
legal realism.  See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial 
Decision Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING 115, 115 (4th ed. 2013) (describing Realists as intuitionists); 
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases, 93 CORN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (positing two “contrasting models” of judging and describing the 
legal realist model as one in which judges “follow an intuitive process to reach conclusions which they 
only later rationalize with deliberative reasoning”).  In intuitive adjudication, the judge reviews the 
evidence and the legal arguments and then waits for a “hunch” or feeling about how to decide the case 
or issue.  She then justifies her intuitive decision ex post by finding law to support it.  See, e.g., Joseph 
C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the Hunch in Judicial Decision, 14 
CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1928).  By contrast, Posner’s pragmatism recognizes that law constrains decisions 
and assumes that judges determine what is reasonable at least in part by applying objective analytical 
methods.  See R. POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 105, at 60-64. 
 111. As an example, see Judge Posner’s opinion in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359 (7th 
Cir. 2012) and his opinion in the same case after the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, Butler v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 112. R. POSNER, REFLECTIONS, supra note 5, at 329-50. 
 113. Id. at 346 (“[w]hat is needed in continuing legal education in short is a change in emphasis from 
legal doctrine, formal legal procedure, and discrete areas of social science . . . to meeting the challenge 
that complexity poses to reliable decision making by federal judges at all levels”).  In the category of 
technical knowledge, he mentions “how to manage encounters with statistical analysis in litigation, 
including appeals” and “the culture rather than the details of scientific inquiry and proof.”  Id. at 346.  
As for judicial decisionmaking, he mentions instruction in “Bayes’s Theorem and other methods of 
rational decisionmaking,” and “the cognitive abilities and psychological characteristics of judges, 
jurors, and witnesses.”  Id. 
 114. I believe it is notable that Posner’s examples of instructional methods do not mention in-person 
judicial education.  For example, he proposes that law schools require students to take some technical-
ly-oriented courses that will be helpful whether they end up as judges or practicing lawyers.  Id. at 347-
48.  He also imagines a role for MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) in teaching technical sub-
jects.  Id. at 348-50.  And he calls on the Federal Judicial Center to continuously review the academic 
literature and provide summaries of relevant technical works.  Id. at 334. 
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method and has little to say about normative ends.
115
  The judge’s obligation, ac-
cording to Posner, is simply to make a “reasonable” decision based on all relevant 
considerations.  Perhaps Posner, like some pragmatists, assumes that judges will 
converge on a common understanding and common conclusions over time.  But it 
is not at all obvious why they would.  Without normative direction, it is hard to 
see how people who disagree about what is reasonable might be persuaded to 
change their views.  After all, even formalists of the sort Posner condemns can 
argue that their formalism constrains judicial power and, as such, is a proper re-
sponse to separation-of-powers demands in a liberal democracy.  They might be 
wrong about this—and I believe they are—but it is hard to see why they should 
give up their position as “unreasonable,” at least without some further specifica-
tion of what reasonableness entails.
116
 
There are theories of civil adjudication that do make normative choices.  The 
two main candidates, efficiency-based theory and rights-based theory, differ in 
how they view the purpose of civil adjudication.  The following sketches each in 
turn. 
a.  Efficiency-Based Theory 
An efficiency-based theory views the purpose of adjudication in terms of 
maximizing social welfare in the aggregate.
117
  Welfare is sometimes maximized 
by strictly following substantive rules and sometimes by engaging in more fact-
specific cost-benefit balancing.
118
  The choice of approach depends on the social 
costs and benefits.  On the procedure side, the efficiency-minded judge is sup-
posed to choose procedures that minimize expected social costs, including the 
costs of process and the costs of outcome error.
119
 
This brief description is highly simplified, but it captures the core features.
120
  
An efficiency-based theory focuses on ex ante incentives, considers marginal 
effects on social costs and benefits, and gives short shrift to individual rights as 
independent constraints on welfare maximization.
121
  These features have strong 
implications for what courts should do and how judges should handle litigation.  
For example, an efficiency-based approach is likely to support broader use of 
                                                          
 115. See R. POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 105, at 55 (agreeing that pragmatism has “no moral 
compass”); Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Radical Pragmatism, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO PRAGMATISM 324 (Alan Malachowski ed., 2013). 
 116. Indeed, Posner is remarkably inattentive to the difficult question of democratic constraints on the 
judicial role and the way fidelity to existing law serves legitimacy values.  See Jeremy Waldron, Unfet-
tered Judge Posner, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (March 20, 2014) (reviewing R. POSNER, 
REFLECTIONS, supra note 5). 
 117. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010). 
 118. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992). 
 119. See ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 114-16 (2003). 
 120. One way the description is simplified is that it assumes deterrence is only a function of reducing 
the risk of outcome error.  A more complicated analysis would also count other ways that litigation 
affects deterrence, including directly through high process costs.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Multistage 
Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1194-95, 1235 (2013). 
 121. This is a very rough statement of a more complicated point.  For example, an efficiency-based 
theory can support deciding cases strictly according to the legal rights of the parties if social welfare 
would be maximized by doing so.  The proviso is still crucial though; the overall goal remains welfare 
maximization and not rights enforcement. 
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class actions than current law permits, stricter limits on discovery, and broader 
nonparty preclusion.
122
  A judge following an efficiency-based theory will tend to 
favor settlement and ADR and even be willing to get involved in actively promot-
ing settlement, at least in those cases where trial is likely to be very costly.
123
 
An efficiency-based theory supports roughly the same recommendations for 
judicial education as Posner’s pragmatic theory.  The judge must know how to 
deal with statistical evidence and complex scientific and technological infor-
mation.  One possible difference has to do with the intensity of instruction in eco-
nomic theory.  An efficiency-minded judge would have to have a fairly extensive 
knowledge of normative economics to know what efficiency demands.  Posner’s 
pragmatic judge, however, is not supposed to rely on abstract theory and likely 
would not need to be as well informed to make a reasonable, all-things-considered 
judgment. 
b.  Rights-Based Theory 
The third theory of civil adjudication is a rights-based theory.  It differs from 
the other two in how it conceives the primary purpose of adjudication.  According 
to rights-based theory, the purpose of adjudication is to enforce the legal rights of 
the parties.  It follows that judicial education in a rights-based system should teach 
judges how to determine those legal rights. 
Professor Ronald Dworkin is perhaps the most famous proponent of a rights-
based theory of adjudication.
124
  A “right” in Dworkin’s theory gives the 
rightholder grounds for resisting decisions that aim to achieve collective goals or 
maximize aggregate welfare.  This conception of a right is familiar from constitu-
tional law.  The First Amendment, for example, gives individuals a right to free-
dom of speech that constrains state action justified on social welfare grounds.  
Dworkin applies a similar idea to all legal rights.  In short, legal rights act as 
trumps that constrain aggregate welfare maximization. 
Legal interpretation is central to Dworkin’s theory because it is through inter-
pretation that judges determine what rights parties have.  Interpretation for 
Dworkin involves dimensions of fit and justification.  A sound interpretation is 
one that fits existing law and embodies a normatively attractive justification for 
that law.  For example, a judge faced with a common law decision must construct 
a coherent set of principles that fits the relevant common law precedent and justi-
fies that precedent on morally attractive grounds, taking account of the broader 
legal context in which the case arises.
125
  These principles then define the legal 
rights that parties possess.  Similarly, a judge faced with applying a statute must 
                                                          
 122. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Discovery, in PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 67 (C.W. 
Sanchirico ed., 2012); Preclusion, in id. at 188; Class Actions, in id. at 350.  Roughly speaking, a class 
action is justified when the social benefits in terms of better outcomes, stronger compliance incentives, 
and reduced litigation costs exceed the social costs of managing a complicated procedural structure.  
So too, an efficiency-based approach can justify stricter discovery limits to control for strategic abuse.  
And broader nonparty preclusion makes sense when repeated litigation is not likely to produce signifi-
cantly more accurate results. 
 123. An efficiency-based theory considers both costs and benefits. 
 124. See R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 101; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter, R. DWORKIN, TRS]. 
 125. See R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 101, at 228-75, 309-12 (illustrating how integrity 
works with a common law example and responding to the utilitarian account of common law duties). 
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interpret the statute in a way that fits the legislative record and also justifies the 




Dworkin’s theory is complex, and this is not the place to delve into it in de-
tail.  But even this brief summary highlights major differences between a rights-
based theory and its pragmatic and efficiency-based counterparts.  Central to 
Dworkin’s theory is the notion that every person has a right to treatment as an 
equal, which entitles her to equal concern and respect.
127
  This right has several 
implications.  For one thing, it means that stare decisis is not just a matter of 
weighing social costs and benefits, as it is in a pragmatic theory.  Judges have a 
moral obligation to respect precedent, an obligation based on treating litigants as 
equals.
128
  Moreover, it is not enough that a judicial decision improve aggregate 
social welfare; it must honor the right of each person to equal concern and respect 
as well as the specific institutional rights that flow from this background right.  On 
the procedure side, the right to treatment as an equal imposes equality-based con-
straints on the distribution of outcome error, constraints that must be satisfied 
before cost-minimization can be pursued.
129
  For example, Dworkin’s rights-based 
theory might well reject stricter pleading rules that systematically and seriously 




As far as I know, Dworkin never discussed the implications of his theory for 
judicial education, but some conclusions are fairly obvious.  Since factual accura-
cy is at least as important in Dworkin’s theory as it is in pragmatic and efficiency-
based theories, the same arguments can be made for courses teaching judges how 
to handle complicated technological facts and empirical evidence.
131
  But there is 
one area in which Dworkin’s theory is likely to generate different course recom-
mendations.  Judges must be familiar with at least some aspects of moral and po-
litical theory to be able to identify morally attractive principles that fit existing 
law and thereby determine parties’ rights.  Hence it would be important to teach 
aspects of moral and political theory as well.
132
 
                                                          
 126. Id. at 313-17, 337-50.  In Dworkin’s view, it is a mistake to treat a statute as if it were the com-
mand of a personified legislature or a public choice bargain between legislators and interest groups.  
Instead, a statute should be interpreted as the product of a legislature committed to honoring democrat-
ic principles within practical constraints. 
 127. See R. DWORKIN, TRS, supra note 124.  In his later work, Dworkin recasts this central norm in 
terms of a principle of integrity.  See R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 101, at 176-224. 
 128. The obligation to follow precedent is also tied to integrity.  See R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 
supra note 101, at 225-27. 
 129. See Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985); 
Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2010). 
 130. In other words, if limiting procedures increases the risk of error, the increased risk must be justly 
distributed in order to satisfy the requirements of a rights-based theory. 
 131. In a sense, it is even more important.  Since it is not enough to cite high social costs alone as a 
justification for limiting substantive rights enforcement, there is a strong imperative to find the facts 
correctly even when an efficiency-based theory would cut corners to save costs. 
 132. By contrast, Posner’s pragmatism eschews moral and political theory, and it is difficult to see 
what relevance moral theory could possibly have for an efficiency-based theory. 
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B.  A New Justification for Judicial Education 
To recap, there are several different theories of adjudication, which have 
somewhat different implications for the content of judicial education programs.  
All three theories examined in Section A support courses teaching judges how to 
deal with statistical evidence, scientific evidence, and technical subject matter.  
However, Dworkin’s rights-based theory would also seem to support instruction 
in moral and political theory, and an efficiency-based theory would seem to re-
quire more intensive instruction in normative economics.  The striking fact, how-
ever, is that none of these subjects are well suited to short courses involving in-
person, face-to-face instructional formats.
133
 
The conclusion is different for case management techniques and process 
skills.  These topics might well be suited to in-person instruction, especially since 
that format allows for simulations and personal feedback.  The problem with 
teaching this material is not so much choosing the optimal format as it is figuring 
out what should be taught.  People disagree about what judges should do in man-
aging litigation and deciding cases and this means they are bound to disagree as 
well about what judges should be taught.  Those favoring an efficiency-based 
theory, for example, are more likely than those favoring a rights-based theory to 




An important insight follows from this analysis.  The choice of curriculum 
depends on controversial assumptions about what constitutes good judging.  This 
means that one must first formulate a reasonably coherent conception of good 
judging before one can design effective judicial education courses.  It is not 
enough merely to teach a menu of different options from which judges can 
choose.  Proper adjudication is not something individual judges decide as a matter 
of personal preference or conviction.  A judge has a duty, by virtue of her role 
within the existing system of adjudication, to act in a manner consistent with the 
core principles and practices of that institution.  As a result, she has an obligation 
to formulate a theory of adjudication that fits the institution in a normatively at-
tractive way. 
Any such theory will almost certainly differ from the three pure theories dis-
cussed above.  American civil litigation is simply too complex and varied to fit a 
single theory.  Our procedural system, for example, values rights as well as effi-
ciency and cares about individual participation for dignitary as well as outcome-
quality reasons.
135
  Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that any normative account 
will be a hybrid theory, not perfectly consistent internally but coherent enough to 
ground a principled practice. 
                                                          
 133. As discussed above, instruction in how to deal with statistics, scientific evidence, and technical 
subject matter is better delivered through web modules.  See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying 
text.  Moreover, it is not easy to see how an adequate introduction to moral and political theory can be 
provided in a one or two week course. 
 134. Proponents of a rights-based theory should be more cautious about the effect of case manage-
ment techniques on outcome error, regardless of litigation cost savings.  More precisely, a rights-based 
case-management course is likely to stress greater sensitivity to the effect of discovery limits on access 
to information necessary for rights vindication and greater attention to the risk that active settlement 
promotion might skew outcomes in individual cases. 
 135. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem With Contractarian Theories 
of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2003) [hereinafter Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process]. 
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Constructing such a theory necessarily involves interpreting existing rules and 
practices as parts of an integrated whole.  The overall goal must be to find a rea-
sonably coherent set of principles that fit settled aspects of litigation practice and 
also justify that practice as the best it can be given what it is.  The approach I have 
in mind is similar to Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive approach and has much in 
common with John Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium.136  Roughly speaking, 
one moves back and forth between relatively settled aspects of litigation practice 
and more general principles that justify that practice, adjusting practice and prin-
ciple until the two fit together in a reflective equilibrium.  The goal is not to con-
struct an ideal theory in the abstract or simply to collect existing rules and princi-
ples intact.  The goal is to critically prune and adjust theory and practice until the 
result satisfactorily accounts for core features of adjudication in a way that makes 




This process of critical reflection is difficult to do on one’s own.  This is 
where in-person, face-to-face instruction comes into play.  In-person classes offer 
an opportunity for guided reflection in a group setting, where ideas can be chal-
lenged, modified and then challenged again.  One can imagine an instructor or one 
of the judge-participants proposing a principle that fits certain aspects of litigation 
practice, and other judges testing the principle on other aspects, refining it, and 
debating the refinements—with everyone gaining a better understanding of the 
normative stakes through discussion and debate.
138
  It might be possible to repli-
cate this process through written exchanges, but I very much doubt it.  In-person, 
face-to-face discussion allows for immediate feedback closely tailored to the ideas 
being expressed and also facilitates back-and-forth exchanges capable of honing 
imprecise ideas and focusing on their implications.
139
  Once again, the aim is to 
try to reach agreement on a normative account that fits and justifies the core fea-
tures of existing adjudication. 
This is a tall order, to be sure.  But it is not an impossible task.  Recall that 
participants are not debating their own personal preferences about how an ideal 
system should be designed.  Instead they are debating competing accounts of an 
existing institution, which provides an external point of reference.  Moreover, the 
imperative to fit and justify that institution should constrain and channel discus-
sion.  Also, the participants have a strong professional stake in achieving a suc-
cessful result that they can use to guide their own decisions.  As judges, they oc-
cupy similar institutional roles and face a common set of professional challenges.  
                                                          
 136. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-19 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing the process 
of seeking a reflective equilibrium); R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 101, at 225–27 (describ-
ing a process of legal reasoning grounded in an effort to form “the best constructive interpretation of 
the community’s legal practice”). 
 137. For a similar account, see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 940-43 (1999) [hereinafter Bone, 
Process of Making Process]. 
 138. It is not impossible for a judge to do this by herself, but she would have to be a Dworkinian 
Hercules to do it well.  See R. DWORKIN, TRS, supra note 124, at 105.   
 139. There is a close analogy between this process and the proper use of socratic instruction in a law 
school classroom.  Over the more than thirty years I have been teaching law, I have found that the 
chief value of the socratic back-and-forth is that it gives students a chance to realize both the potential 
and the limits of their own ideas and to learn from the contributions and mistakes of others.  I am not 
sure how this process could be effectively replicated through written materials or web-based instruc-
tion. 
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Thus, they share a common basis for discussion as well as a common purpose.  
Finally, it is not necessary to develop the best theory; there is value in figuring out 
a workable set of principles that do an adequate job of fitting and justifying and 
that can be improved with further deliberation. 
This is just a brief sketch and I will not go into more detail here.
140
  I have de-
scribed this process of reflective equilibrium in some of my other writing and 
applied it to concrete legal issues.
141
  Obviously, it would be ideal if discussion 
produced a consensus set of principles.  But consensus is not easy to achieve.  
Any principled account of adjudication necessarily implicates values, and alt-
hough existing practice constrains value choice, it does not uniquely determine it.  
However, even a partially successful effort can reap substantial benefits, especial-
ly when other judges can build on it in future discussions.  Moreover, engaging in 
the process itself can be valuable whether or not it yields anything substantive.  
Doing so encourages each judge to engage in the same kind of deliberation when 
deciding a case or managing litigation.
142
  This then is the best use of in-person 
judicial education:  to provide judges with an opportunity to reflect critically on 
their role in the institution of adjudication with an eye to developing a conception 
of that institution capable of guiding future decisions and rule choices. 
CONCLUSION 
The central thesis of this Article is that judicial education must be tied to gen-
eral ideas and beliefs about law, courts, and adjudication.  I have made both a 
positive and a normative case for this thesis.  On the positive side, I showed how 
judicial education emerged in the 1960s in large part because of prevailing ideas 
and beliefs about process jurisprudence and management science.  On the norma-
tive side, I argued that in-person, face-to-face judicial education makes most sense 
as a way for judges to reflect critically on their own ideas and beliefs about courts 
and adjudication. 
The insight of the 1960s, that judicial education is essential to sound adjudi-
cation, continues to hold true today.  Judges must base their procedural decisions 
and choice of procedural rules on a justifiable and normatively attractive view of 
civil adjudication.  This is particularly difficult in a world rife with conflicting 
values and divergent views.  Judicial education serves an important function in 
this world by providing a controlled setting where judges can reflect critically on 
the nature of adjudication and the judicial role.  Only by encouraging this type of 
reflection can we hope to achieve a system of civil adjudication that is principled 
as well as efficacious. 
                                                          
 140. It is important that the teacher be skilled in facilitating discussions of this sort and diligent about 
keeping the participants focused on the goal.  When discussion stalls, the teacher should be prepared to 
offer procedural examples or hypotheticals to stimulate further discussion. 
 141. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate 
Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 614-24 (2011) (day in court); Bone, Pro-
cess of Making Process, supra note 137, at 943-47 (small claim class action); Bone, Agreeing to Fair 
Process, supra note 135, at 547-50 (2003) (subclassing). 
 142. As to the latter, see Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 137, at 940-47.  I understand 
that those involved with judicial education today are interested in the psychology of judicial decision 
making, but that is different than the normative dimension I explore here. 
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